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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates what determine bargaining power between a 
lender and a borrower who have continuing transactional relationships.    Bargaining power 
is proxied by which side of the transaction, i.e. the lender or the borrower, usually incurs a 
shoe-leather cost when they have contact.  The proxy is regressed on three types of 
variables that can potentially determine distribution: (i) lender’s competition, (ii) the degree 
of informational asymmetry between the two parties, and (iii) borrower performance.  
Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that intensive lender competition and 
borrowers’ good performance increase the likelihood of the lender incurring the cost, or the 
borrower’s power.    We also obtain evidence suggesting that some lenders enjoy a status of 
informational monopoly and capture borrowers.   
 
Keywords: Bargaining power, Distribution, Banking relationship, Asymmetric information, 
Competition 




The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate what determine bargaining power, or 
distribution, between two parties involving a transaction.    From a uniquely designed survey of 
corporate finance issues that contains information about continuing transactional relationships 
between small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and their main lending banks, we obtain a 
proxy for the bargaining power: which side of the transaction, a lender or a borrower, usually 
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 incurs a shoe-leather cost when they have contact.
1  We regress this unique proxy on three 
types of variables that can potentially determine rent distribution: (i) lender’s competition (the 
degree of competition), (ii) borrower performance (creditworthiness of the borrower), and (iii) 
the availability of borrower’s information (the degree of informational asymmetry between the 
two  parties).   
Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that intensive lender competition and 
borrowers’ good performance make the borrower powerful and increase the likelihood of lender 
incurring the cost.  As for the availability of borrower’s information, although we find that 
frequent availability of hard information decreases the likelihood, neither lender’s knowledge 
about the borrower nor auditing of financial statements makes difference in determining the 
bargaining power.  Thus, the impact of asymmetric information on bargaining power is found 
to be relatively weak.    We also obtain evidence suggesting that some lenders enjoy a status of 
informational monopoly and capture borrowers. 
The biggest contribution of this paper is its uniqueness in directly testing theoretical 
predictions from the theory of competition, the bargaining theory, or the economics of 
information on the determinants of distribution.   On balance, the results obtained in this paper 
confirm the validity of those theories.  Competition and borrower quality matter as 
determinants of bargaining power, whereas informational asymmetry does not play a big role. 
Distribution between a lender and a borrower is an important empirical issue in the 
literature on banking relationships.  One of their focuses is on whether or not a stronger 
bank-borrower relationship leads to any material benefit to the borrower in the form of 
favorable terms of credit such as a low loan interest rate.
2  Although our focus here as 
explained above is not limited to the effect from a strong banking relationship, since we have a 
proxy for the strength of the banking relationship as an independent variable, the present study 
can also be regarded as one of the benefit studies of banking relationship.    As such, the present 
paper adds to this literature by making use of our unique proxy for the relationship benefit.    An 
advantage of this proxy over the credit-term proxies in the conventional studies is that our proxy 
captures an average benefit with a longer-term perspective in a sense that lender-borrower 
                                                  
1  In the case of bank lending to SMEs, lenders have frequent contact with the borrower in the course of a 
long-term relationship in order to monitor and collect information about the borrowers’ creditworthiness.   
For this strong banking relationship, see a survey by Boot (2000), for example. 
2  See studies such as Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995).    See Boot (2000) as well. 
 2 contact is more frequent phenomena than loan contracting. 
Burdett et al. (1995) theoretically investigate a closely related issue of should I stay or 
should I go in a search model.    Their focus is however on an endogenous choice of go or stay 
by agents searching for a new partner to transact.  In the present paper, we investigate the 
distribution between two parties which already have some stable transactional relationships in 
the form of the main bank relationship. 
The remaining part of the paper is composed as follows.  In the next section, we briefly 
survey theoretical predictions on the determinants of the bargaining power.  Data and 
methodology are introduced in Section 3.  Section 4 reports the results.  The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2 Theory 
In this paper, the term bargaining power refers in a broad sense to what determine the 
“share of the cake,” or distribution, between two parties involving in a transaction.  In a Nash 
bargaining context, the bargaining power is just defined as the relative weights put on utilities of 
the trade partners which constitute their joint objective function to maximize.  The basic 
Rubinstein alternating-offers model shows that the weights are determined by the relative 
magnitude of the two players’ discount rates.
3  The term is, however, often used in different 
contexts to refer to rent distribution in general between two parties involving a transaction.  
We use the term in this broader sense. 
As such, theories make several predictions about the determinants of the bargaining power.   
First of all, we expect that the degree of competition is an important factor to determine the 
power.  Theory of competition predicts that competition gets rid of excessive rents from the 
competing parties.  Competition on one side of the transaction provides a party on the other 
side with a greater chance to meet a different trade partner at a lower price.  We thus expect 
that  the more intensive competition that the lender faces, the greater power the borrower 
obtains. 
Borrower’s performance or creditworthiness is also a factor affecting the bargaining power.   
If there is scarcity of supply in good borrowers, a creditworthy borrower attracts a bigger 
                                                  
3 If there is a risk of breakdown, the weights also depend on the breakdown probability.  See Mothoo 
(1999) for example.   
 3 number of lenders and thus obtains greater power.  The hypothesis is therefore that a more 
creditworthy borrower obtains greater power. 
Finally, informational asymmetry may also play a big role in the determination of the 
bargaining power.  As the economics of information predicts in a variety of models, a party 
with informational advantage can extract informational rent from a trading partner who has 
inferior information.  This implies that as a lender becomes more knowledgeable about a 
borrower, the lender obtains greater power.     
However, we should also take into account the informational asymmetry among lenders 
with respect to the information of the borrower’s creditworthiness.  If the knowledge the 
incumbent bank obtains is private information, the bank obtains a status of informational 
monopoly as opposed to competing banks, and can obtain greater power (Greenbaum et 
al.(1989), Sharpe(1990), Rajan(1992), and von Thadden(2004)).    However, if the knowledge is 
public information which even competing banks can be accessible to, competition gets rid of the 
power from the lender.     
 
3 Data and methodology 
Data source 
The data source of this paper is the “Management Survey of Corporate Finance Issues in 
the Kansai Area,” which was conducted in Japan in June 2005 by the Regional Finance 
Workshop in the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI).  This RIETI 
survey asks small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) about firm characteristics, 
management strategy, bank relationships, and loan screening process.
4  We have effective 
answers from 2020 firms which locate in the three prefectures, Osaka, Hyogo, and Kyoto, in the 
Kansai area in Japan.
5  The average sample firm was established in 1967, employs 150 persons, 
has a capitalization of 764 million yen, and has 1.19 billion yen of sales.  The length of the 
relationship between an SME and its main bank in our data set is very long and is 27.9 years on 
average. 
 
                                                  
4  The data set is the same as that for Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006a, 2006b).    See Uchida, Udell, and 
Yamori (2006a) for more details of the data set. 
5 Kansai area is located in the middle of the main island of Japan, and the three prefectures in the area 
form the focal point for the economy of western Japan. 
 4 Methodology and dependent variable 
We run a regression with taking a proxy for bargaining power as a dependent variable.  
The dependent and independent variables are explained below.  Their descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 1.    The availability of all the variables reduced the number of observations and 
the regression is run with 1075 observations. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable THEYCOME, which is constructed as follows.   
In the RIETI survey, firms are asked “where do you (= the firm’s entrepreneur or a person in 
charge) usually meet with the loan officer of your main bank,” and the firm chooses an answer 
from three options: 1. at your company, 2. at the bank branch office, and 3. other places.  The 
variable THEYCOME takes a value of one if the firm chose option 1, and zero if the firm chose 
option 2.
6  This variable represents which side of the transaction, a lender or a borrower, 
usually incurs a shoe-leather cost when they have contact.  Incurring the cost corresponds to 
the lack of bargaining power.  We run a Probit regression with this variable as the dependent 
variable. 
 
Main Independent variables 
Based on the discussion in Section 2, we use independent variables that are grouped into 
three categories.  First, to proxy bank competition, we use two variables.  The RIETI survey 
asks borrowers, “whether the frequency of visit by banks other than the main bank increased in 
the past two years.”  We construct a dummy variable VISITINC_OTHER which takes on a 
value of one if the firm answered yes to this question.  This dummy variable represents the 
intensification of competition between the main bank and other banks (from a borrowers’ point 
of view).  We also include the number of the banks that the firm currently borrows from, 
N_BK, as an independent variable.  This variable captures the degree of competition among 
banks which already have transactional relationships with the borrower.    We predict that these 
variables have a positive impact on THEYCOME. 
Second, we use two proxies for borrowers’ performance.  PERFORMANCE_S is a 
dummy variable representing that the borrowing firm was in surplus (i.e. profitable) in the last 
accounting year.  A dividend dummy DIVIDEND, which takes on a value of one if the firm 
paid dividend in the last accounting year, also represents the firm’s good performance.  These 
                                                  
6  Sample firms which chose “other places” are excluded from the sample. 
 5 two variables proxy for good performance of the borrower, and should have a positive impact 
on the dependent variable. 
Finally, several variables are used as proxies for the availability of borrower’s information.   
Here, we make a distinction between hard verifiable information from financial statements and 
soft non-verifiable information such as the entrepreneur’s personal skills and integrity.  The 
former can be transferred or documented, whereas the latter is difficult to document and 
deteriorates through its transmission among agents or within organizational hierarchy.  This 
distinction is important because they might have different impact on rent distribution.  The 
former is likely to be public information, the availability of which should increase borrower 
power.  The latter is likely to be private information, the production of which should increase 
lender power (under intensive lender competition).  The distinction is important also because 
different lending technologies might be employed depending on the hardness/softness of 
information.
7     
To represent availability of hard information, we use three variables.    First, AUDIT takes 
on a value of one if the firm has its financial statements audited by a CPA.    Second, FINSTAT 
is a dummy variable which equals to one if the firm has any financial statements.  Finally, 
FREQ_FINSTAT represents how many times a year the firm submits financial statements to the 
main bank.  Among these three variables, AUDIT is the most important because it represents 
that the information from financial statements is certified by a third party, and is thus reliable.  
If these variables capture publicly available information, they are likely to have a positive 
impact on THEYCOME.  However, if hard information proxied by these variables is private 
information, the impact should be negative. 
The availability of soft information is difficult to measure.  We thus use an index a la 
Scott (2004) that captures to what extent the main bank is knowledgeable about the borrower in 
terms of soft information.  The RIETI survey asks the respondent firms about characteristics 
regarding which the firm rates the lender’s knowledge.  Six of them are with respect to soft 
information.
8    Following Scott (2004) and using these six characteristics, we created a measure 
                                                  
7  When hard information from financial statements is available, banks can deploy the financial statement 
lending technology.  When only soft information is available, banks should employ the relationship 
lending technology.    See Berger and Udell (2002, 2006) for more on lending technologies. 
8 The six characteristics are: 1. [The lender] Knows your business (the firm itself and its business), 2. 
[The lender] Knows your managers and owners (the firm's managers and owners), 3. [The lender] Knows 
 6 of soft information production, SOFT.
9  Since SOFT is likely to be associated with private 
knowledge of the main bank, we expect that the variable has a negative impact on 
THEYCOME.   
 
Relationship strength 
LENGTH is the length of the relationship between the borrower and the main bank.  
Since the main bank can accumulate proprietary information about the borrower through a 
long-term relationship, this variable may have a negative impact on THEYCOME.  However, 
if the information is not unique to the main bank or is gradually funneled out, the bank cannot 
obtain a monopoly status and then LENGTH may have a positive impact. 
It should be noted here that because THEYCOME proxies for a relative benefit between a 
lender and a borrower, the regression with LENGTH as an independent variable can be 
considered as an analysis on whether there is any benefit from a strong bank-borrower 
relationship.  There is abundance of studies on the banking relationships which empirically 
examine the benefit by using terms of credit such as a loan interest rate as proxies for the 
benefit.
10  As one of such studies, the present study adds to the literature by using our unique 
proxy for the benefit.  Compared with frequent lender-borrower contacts in the course of a 
long-term relationship, loan contracts are made occasionally, so that credit terms are observed 
relatively infrequently.  Our unique proxy, i.e. which usually incurs a cost of contact, has an 
advantage over conventional credit-term proxies since it captures benefit on a continuous basis 
in the course of everyday contact between the lender and the borrower.    Individual credit terms 
may not be good proxies also because they are simultaneously determined and are thus difficult 
to evaluate in their isolation. 
                                                                                                                                                  
your industry (the firm's industry), 4. [The lender] Knows the local community (the local community the 
firm is in), 5. [The lender] Know the market (the firm's market), and 6. Social contact with loan officer 
(loan officer has frequent contact with the firm). 
9 With respect to each of the characteristics, the survey asks (1) how important the firm reckons it in 
doing business with a financial institution (in general).  This question captures the firm’s perception of 
what define a good lender.    The firms are also asked to evaluate (2) to what extent the current main bank 
is satisfactory for each characteristic.  This captures the firm’s evaluation of the current main bank.  
The answers to the both questions are chosen on a 5-point scale from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad).    For 
each of the six characteristics, we constructed a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm 
chose 1 for both questions (1) and (2).    SOFT is the first component of the principal component analysis 
over the resulting six dummies.    Note that the survey that Scott (2004) uses allows him to use only four 
similar characteristics to construct an index. 
10  See Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Kano et al. (2006), for example. 
 7  
Control variables 
We also use different control variables.    ASSET is the size of the firm’s asset, FIRMAGE 
is the age of the firm, EMPLOYEE is the number of employees.  These variables may also 
represent the size-related availability of hard and public information of the borrower that is 
different from financial statement information.    In that case, the coefficients of these variables 
should be negative.  Similar prediction applies to other two dummy variables, LISTED which 
represents that the firm is listed, and AFFILIATE which represents that the firm is affiliated 
with a parent company.     
We also use two bank-type dummies to represent the size and the organizational 
complexity of the lending bank.  COOPERATIVE takes on a value of one if the main bank is 
either a Shinkin bank or a credit cooperative.  REGIONAL represents that the firm’s main 
bank is either a regional bank or a second tier regional bank.  Banks represented by 
COOPERATIVE is smaller in size and less complex in terms of organizational structure than 
banks represented by REGIONAL.  The latter is however smaller and less complex than a 
bank of three types (= default): a city bank, a long-term credit bank, or a trust bank.  These 
dummies are introduced to control for the difference in lenders’ characteristics and the lending 
technologies used.  Stein (2002) theoretically shows that while small banks are good at 
producing soft information, large banks are not.  This implies a negative coefficient of 
COOPERATIVE (and REGIONAL to a lesser extent). 
Finally, we use industry dummies and urban (regional) dummies.  Industry dummies are 
CONST (construction), IT (information and telecommunication), TRANSPORT (transportation), 
WHOLESALE (wholesale), RETAIL (retail), REALESTATE (real estate), and SERVICES 
(other services).  Three urban dummies are OSAKA, KOBE, and KYOTO which are 
constructed from the firm’s area code of the telephone number and thus represent that the firm is 
located in or around the three biggest cities in the Kansai area.  The default firm is in the 
manufacturing industry and locates in rural areas. 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the regression results of the Probit estimation.  First, VISITINC_OTHER 
which represents increased competition among lenders is positive and significant, meaning that 
 8 intensification of lenders’ competition leads to lenders incurring the shoe-leather cost.  This is 
consistent with a theoretical prediction that competition gets rid of rents.  The number of 
lending banks is however not significant.  This may imply that it is not competition with 
incumbent banks but competition with potential lenders that matters. 
As for the two performance variables, both of them have a positively significant impact on 
THEYCOME.  Consistent with a theoretical prediction, lenders tend to incur the shoe-leather 
cost and visit borrowers when their performance is good.    Creditworthy borrowers have bigger 
bargaining power. 
Among the four information availability variables, only FREQ_FINSTAT is significant.  
Frequent submission of financial statements contributes to the borrowers’ visits to the lenders’ 
place.  This is consistent with the theoretical prediction in a sense that increased transparency 
of borrowers reduces lenders’ informational disadvantage and thereby increases lender power.  
However, this result may also imply that the borrower with small bargaining power has to 
disclose its information more frequently.  On balance, the results on information availability 
variables are not very strong since the other three variables are insignificant. 
Finally, LENGTH has a negative impact on THEYCOME.  This may imply that a bank 
can accumulate information about the borrower through a longer relationship and obtain a status 




Using a unique proxy, we examined the determinants of bargaining power between lenders 
and borrowers.  The results were consistent with theoretical predictions that competition 
among lending banks and good performance of the borrower contribute to the borrowers’ 
extraction of more bargaining power from the lender.  We also found evidence that resolving 
informational asymmetry leads to lenders obtaining more bargaining power, although the 
evidence was weak.     
On balance, the results obtained in this paper confirm the validity of those theories.  
Competition and borrower quality matter as determinants of bargaining power, although 
informational asymmetry does not play a very big role. 
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 11 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
THEYCOME 1539 0.803 0.398 0 1
VISITINC_OTHER 1649 0.559 0.497 0 1
N_BK 1563 3.638 3.145 0 34
PERFORMANCE_S 1649 0.813 0.390 0 1
DIVIDEND 1649 0.429 0.495 0 1
FREQ_FINSTAT 1444 2.499 2.986 1 13
FINSTAT 1649 0.953 0.211 0 1
AUDIT 1649 0.129 0.335 0 1
SOFT 1649 0.072 1.725 -0.7323 9.1724
LENGTH 1514 27.053 16.324 0 109
LOG(ASSET) 1486 21.014 1.737 12.9480 28.2955
LOG(EMPLOYEE) 1637 3.951 1.280 0.0000 10.0470
FIRMAGE 1479 49.360 24.368 1 136
LISTED 1649 0.040 0.196 0 1
AFFILIATE 1649 0.131 0.337 0 1
REGIONAL 1649 0.192 0.394 0 1
COOPERATIVE 1649 0.159 0.366 0 1
CONST 1649 0.124 0.330 0 1
IT 1649 0.029 0.166 0 1
TRANSPORT 1649 0.067 0.251 0 1
WHOLESALE 1649 0.198 0.399 0 1
RETAIL 1649 0.058 0.234 0 1
REALESTATE 1649 0.023 0.150 0 1
RESTAU_HOTEL 1649 0.018 0.134 0 1
SERVICES 1649 0.118 0.322 0 1
OSAKA 1649 0.423 0.494 0 1
KOBE 1649 0.096 0.295 0 1
KYOTO 1649 0.145 0.352 0 1
Table 1  Descriptive StatisticsStd. Error Prob.  
VISITINC_OTHER 0.0637 ** 0.0252 0.0100
N_BK -0.0023 0.0046 0.6170
PERFORMANCE_S 0.0646 * 0.0339 0.0410
DIVIDEND 0.0929 *** 0.0253 0.0000
Soft Info. SOFT 0.0067 0.0068 0.3240
FREQ_FINSTAT -0.0214 *** 0.0034 0.0000
FINSTAT -0.0705 0.0511 0.2640
AUDIT -0.0002 0.0355 0.9950
LENGTH -0.0023 *** 0.0008 0.0070
LOG(ASSET) 0.0291 ** 0.0142 0.0410
LOG(EMPLOYEE) -0.0143 0.0182 0.4330
FIRMAGE 0.0006 0.0006 0.3310
LISTED 0.0681 0.0609 0.3580
AFFILIATE -0.1305 *** 0.0496 0.0030
REGIONAL -0.0353 0.0335 0.2730
UNION -0.0272 0.0366 0.4410
CONST -0.0080 0.0370 0.8270
IT 0.0594 0.0563 0.3710
TRANSPORT 0.0317 0.0435 0.4960
WHOLESALE 0.0725 ** 0.0279 0.0210
RETAIL 0.0014 0.0488 0.9770
REALESTATE -0.1020 0.1120 0.2990
RESTAU_HOTEL 0.1093 0.0513 0.1870
SERVICES 0.0667 * 0.0311 0.0650
OSAKA 0.0409 0.0268 0.1320
KOBE 0.0085 0.0413 0.8390






The result from a Probit estimation is shown. The dependent variable THEYCOME is
equal to one if the borrower and the main bank usually have contact at the borrower's
place as opposed to the branch office of the main bank.
The main independent variables are grouped into three categories: (1) Lenders
comeptition, (2) Availability of Information, and (3) Borrower Performance. (1) Lenders
comeptition: Dummy variables VISITINC_OTHER and VISITINC_MB represent the
increase in visits from the banks other than the main bank (OTHER) and the main bank
(MB), respectivelly. N_BK represents the number of lending banks. (2) Availability of
Information: SOFT is an index a la Scott (2002) for the lender's knolwedge about the
borrower in terms of soft information. FREQ_FINSTAT is the frequency that the
borrower submits its financial statements to the borrower. FINSTAT represents the
existence of any financial statements. AUDIT represents that the borrower have its
financial statements audited.  (3) Borrower Performance: PERFORMANCE_S equals to









Table 2  Estimation Result
(Independent variable = THEYCOME)
     dF/dx
Hard Info.
Availability of
Information
Borrower Performance
Lender Competition